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SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
IN BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES:
FOREIGN INVESTORS’ PERSPECTIVE
M. Aji Satria S.
Abstract
The limit of host states’ right to regulate foreign investment within their
jurisdiction has been the main, yet unresolved issues in international
investment law. This makes it more difficult, given the global structure of
investment law that consists of networks of Bilateral Investment Treaties
(BITs). This article will not deal with the question of optimal structure of
regulatory discretion under BITs which is still debatable among scholars.
The central agenda of this article is to address the precondition for an
efficient outcome to materialize within the complex web of BITs already
signed among states. It is even more complex to be concluded. This issue
is due to the absence of international coordinating institution, letting
alone that of global supranational authority. This is different from the
case of domestic regulatory takings which “simply” requires the correct
information and measure from the benevolent government, that means,
the existence of an efficient provision, if any, will not necessarily result
in an efficient outcome. The main research question addressed in the
article is: under what condition a capital exporting state could introduce
higher flexibility for regulating public interest in an investment treaty
negotiation? The article offer the answer on issue linkage between the
level of protection under BIT, the degree of openness of access to domestic
legal and regulatory making of the host state, and the foreign investor’s
capabilities to deal with the trade-off. Ceteris paribus, the linkage enables
a set of feasible Pareto improving deals out of BIT negotiation

Introduction

The limit of host states’ right to regulate foreign investment within their
jurisdiction has been the main, yet unresolved issues in international investment
law. Under a standard investment treaty, regulatory measures to protect or
promote social and environmental objectives, that diminish the value of foreign
investments, could be deemed as regulatory expropriation; pursuant to which
the host state is required to pay for compensation to the foreign investor under
the shadow of direct investor-state arbitration. The solution for this problem
mainly calls for the introduction of broader provision in international investment
Assistant Lecturer at Faculty of Law University of Indonesia
Various literatures offer different forms of solutions to this problem. See for example Eric
Neumayer, Greening Trade and Investment: Environmental Protection without Protectionism, (Earth Scan,
2001); Luke Eric Peterson, “Human Rights and Bilateral Investment Treaties: Mapping the Role of Human
Rights Law within Investor State Arbitration”, (Rights & Democracy (International Centre for Human Rights
and Democratic Development), 2009); Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
International Investment Law: A Changing Landscape (OECD Publishing, 2005).
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agreement that allows for more flexibility, in the form of exceptions for public
interest concerns, of a benevolent host state to regulate matters concerning
social and environmental protection.  
The foremost issue of incorporating broader provision concerning social
and environmental protection in an investment treaty concluded between
states is the dilemma posing the requirement for a trade-off. Reducing the cost
for internalizing the externalities on one hand, and increasing the chance for the
host state’s opportunistic behavior on the other. A standard economic argument
for not providing compensation for a regulatory taking is acceptable when
such action is designated to internalize the externalities that arise from market
failure of the investment activities. However, introducing excessive discretion
can create fiscal illusion when the purpose of the regulation is to deliver certain
gain or benefit to the society. Further, one should also be aware of a potential
regulatory capture, being a regulation that serves a certain private interest not
at all related to any economic rationale.
Besides, international investment legal regime has a peculiar feature that
even adds up to more complexities: the non-existence of one single judicial
body that serves as focal point to coordinate the development of jurisprudence
over the matters. This feature is a logical consequence of the structure of
international investment regime itself which consists of thousands of Bilateral
Investment Treaties (BITs), bilateral and regional Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
that contained investment chapters, as well as investment-related provisions in
the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Amid these complex settings,
countries must negotiate among each others to incorporate efficient provisions
into investment treaties.
This article will not deal with the question of optimal structure of
regulatory discretion which is still debatable among scholars. Rather it assumes
that the provision of several model BIT that provide greater flexibility including
the United States Model of Bilateral Investment Treaty (US Model BIT) and
the Canada Model of Bilateral Investment Treaty (Canada Model BIT) to be
considerably sufficient to respond to the issue at hand.  

OECD, supra note 1. See also Daniel Kalderimis, “Investment Treaties and Public Goods”,
(Presentation to AIELN Conference, Tokyo, 2009); Ursula Kriebaum, “Regulatory Takings: Balancing the
Interests of the Investor and the State”, 8 The Journal of World Investment and Trade (2007), p.717–744.

For a general overview on takings and regulatory takings, see Thomas J. Miceli and Kathleen
Segerson, “Takings”, (1999) in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, available at http://encyclo.findlaw.
com/6200book.pdf

See William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics, (Harvard University
Press, 1995); Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, (Harvard
University Press, 1985).

Epstein, supra note 5.

Luke Eric Peterson, “The Global Governance of FDI: Madly Off in All Directions”, (Friedrich
Ebert Stiftung Dialogue on Globalization Occasional Paper No. 19, 2005). See also Efraim Chalamish,
“The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De Facto Multilateral Agreement”, 34 Brooklyn Journal of
International Law 2 (2009). For the diffusion of BITs, see Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth A.
Simmons, “Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000”, International
Organization 60 (Fall 2006): p. 811-846.

There are also Model BIT offered by civil societies including that from the International Institute
for Sustainable Development (IISD) (see http://www.iisd.org/investment/model/ (last access 1 August
2010). The United States (USS) has also asked reputable civil societies including Oxfam, Friends of the
Earth, and Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) to provide input for their Model BIT revision.
See http://www.ciel.org/Tae/US_ModelTreaty_23Oct09.html (last access 31 July 2010). These model will
be neglected in the article analysis.
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The central agenda of this article is to address the precondition for that
efficient outcome to materialize within the complex web of BITs already signed
among states. It is even more complex to be concluded. This issue is due to the
absence of international coordinating institution, letting alone that of global
supranational authority. This is different from the case of domestic regulatory
takings which requires “simply” the correct information and measure from the
benevolent government, that said, the existence of an efficient provision, if any,
will not necessarily result in an efficient outcome.
The building blocks of this article will be based on the following two
underlying frameworks. Firstly, although allowing flexibility of a BIT would
increase the joint surplus of both the capital exporting state and the host state,
there is no credible threat from the potential host states to the capital exporting
state that can compel the latter to modify its offer in a BIT negotiation. When an
agreement is considered to be inefficient, the economics of contract reserves
one party to commit an “efficient breach” to such agreement. However credible
this efficient breach threat is, there is little evidence that this will affect the
global market for international investment treaty negotiation.10 One possible
explanation is that investment treaty serves not only as a country’s commitment
to foreign direct investment (FDI) per se, but also as commitment and reputation
to the country’s global economic position in general. This incurs highly
inefficient reputational costs for an efficient breach to prevail. Potential host
states have weaker bargaining power to influence the result of the negotiation
(and renegotiation), thus the capital exporting states can de facto unilaterally
determine the structure of an investment treaty.
Secondly, the structure of the global BITs network resembles that of a
prisoner’s dilemma model between potential host states that prevent collective
action demanding flexible provisions in BIT negotiation.11 This situation assumes
two possible alternative structures of an investment treaty. The one with strict
provisions and the other with flexible provisions. Potential host states will
always prefer the latter and at the same time recognize that the capital-exporting
countries prefer the former. Collectively potential host states are better off by
forming a collusion not to sign BIT. However, individually, each has the incentive
to attract capital and sign BIT.  
Having considered the above underlying frameworks, the article argues
that although allowing for more discretion in regulating public interest is
desirable from the efficiency point of view, the current structure of the global
investment architecture prevents any significant modification driven by the
potential host states, as the parties suffering from losses. High reputational costs
and high transaction costs become the major stumbling block of any demand for
efficient outcome.
Besides, suppose one would view this as a Coasian bargaining with
positive transaction costs, the efficient outcome would prevail if the initial
entitlement (being the right of having more regulatory discretion) is properly

Charles Goetz and Robert Scott, “Liquidated Damages, Penalties, and the Just Compensation
Principle: A Theory of Efficient Breach”, 77 Columbia Law Review 554 (1977).
10
See sub-section C.1 for further details.
11
See sub-section C.1 for further details. The argument is developed from Guzman’s model of
competition among developing countries. See Andrew T. Guzman, “Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt
Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties”, Virginia Journal of International Law 38
(1998): p. 639-688.
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assigned to the ones who value the most.12 However, in the world absence of
global supranational authority this initial assignment is again not feasible and
the result would solely depend on the negotiation and bargaining between the
relevant parties. Therefore, in the market for BITs, the remaining option to drive
the movement towards efficient outcome should come from the supply of the
capital exporting states.
The question is then, why would a capital exporting state be driven to
change the provision of a BIT which, although welfare-enhancing jointly, will
increase the risk of higher chance of opportunistic behavior from the potential
host states? This leads to the main question presented in the article: under what
condition a capital exporting state could introduce higher flexibility for regulating
public interest in an investment treaty negotiation? In order to address the
question, a full and comprehensive framework concerning the relations among
the capital exporting states, foreign investors, and potential host states should
be taken into account, including the underlying economic rationale and political
context.
One important insight is the different in nature between foreign direct
investors, which only concern about profit maximization, and host states
which also have distributional concerns for their domestic stakeholders. A
comprehensive analysis of the relationship between them must take into account
domestic interest groups that influence a state’s preferences.
Another insight rests upon the basic political science model of Obsolescing
Bargaining Mechanism (OBM).13 This theory argues that foreign investors have
relatively more ex ante bargaining power prior to an investment being made
because of their mobility, as opposed to the host states which depend on
immobilized and given certain endowment factors. This early advantage would
however shift in favor of host states’ ex post benefit, because once the capital
is injected, it would be locked-in inside that particular country’s territory for
a long period, and the host states can commit actions to level up its position.
However, in practice foreign investors can still retain their bargaining power
even after the investment has been made.14 One assumption that did not hold
up in the standard theory is that investment negotiation is a one-shot game,
and contractual agreements (including BITs) are the only way to influence the
relationship structure between the investor and the host state. This standard
theory thus assumes that investors have little impact on local institutions or
policies, while the real fact is the contrary.
Therefore, with regard to the incorporation of flexible provisions on
social and environmental issues in BITs, it is argued that foreign investors may
not necessarily lose their bargaining advantage and can still retain their strong
ex ante bargaining power if they can influence the domestic legal system of the
host states to protect their interests. This however does not entail absolute
assurance that foreign investors would succeed through this means, because
they have to compete with the preferences of other interest groups in that
political market. An economic assessment should address the trade-off between
12

1977).

13

Ronald H. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost”, 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1 (1960).
Raymond Vernon, Storm over the Multinationals: The Real Issues, (Harvard University Press,

14
Witold J. Henisz and Bennet A. Zelner, “Legitimacy, Interest Group Pressures and Institutional
Change: The Case of Foreign Investors and Host Country Governments”, (William Davidson Institute
Working Paper Number 589, 2003).
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protection under BITs and influences over domestic legal system. The analysis
of this trade-off will ultimately answer the article’s main question of explaining
normative conditions that promote higher flexibility for regulating social and
environmental issues in BITs.
The main research question addressed in the article is: under what
condition a capital exporting state could introduce higher flexibility for regulating
public interest in an investment treaty negotiation?
The article is mainly theoretical and blends insights, doctrines, and models
from three disciplines of law, economics, and political science. It is developed
to discuss, analyze, criticize, and deconstruct the prevailing theories related to
the issues based on other theories, empirical findings, and country-specific case
studies. An informal theoretical model is built in the final section to frame the
main argument of the article.
This articel introduces the state of the art and framework of the article,
discusses a short history of BITs and the development of social and environmental
provisions in BITs. This also includes the emerging jurisprudence in investor-state
arbitrations in the subject matter, analyses theoretical economic foundations of
the issues, develops an informal model that attempts to explain a possible Pareto
improving exchange between capital exporting states and potential host states
in a BIT negotiation, and concludes the findings and summarizes the answers of
the article question.
Social and Environmental Protection in Bilateral Investment Treaties
1. BITs and Social and Environmental Provisions in a Nutshell
Bilateral Investment Treaty, a treaty concluded between two states
designed to regulate investment between them, serves as an international legal
instrument to attract foreign investment by providing security to foreign investors,
mainly in developing countries where “fear of expropriation might otherwise
deter investment.”15 The first BIT was entered into in 1959 between Germany
and Pakistan, and since then the BITs network has increased drastically. There
has been a massive proliferation of BITs over the past 20 years, with the present
total number of BITs concluded exceeds 2600.16 Even during 2008, when there
was a growing concern of economic nationalism, the general tendency was one
of greater openness, with 58 new BITs were concluded.17 To date, most BITs have
been concluded between a developed country and a developing country, despite
the fact that as of 2008 most inward foreign investment still flows between
developed countries, as the table demonstrates below. The later issues however
show that legal disputes concerning social and environmental protection are
not limited to those between a developed country and a developing country, but
rather more on a general basis.
15
Tom Ginsburg, “International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties
and Domestic Governance”, International Review of Law and Economics 25 (2005).
16
The exact number according to the World Investment Report 2009 of UNCTAD is 2676 http://
unctad.org/en/docs/wir2009_en.pdf (last access 2 August 2010).
17
Supra note 16.
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YEAR
ECONOMY

2001
MODE

FDI Inward
(Measure is in million US Dollars)
2002

2003

2004

Developing
economies

Flow
Stock

215,421.14
1,795,446.8

175,934.92
1,757,930.5

183,993.96
2,008,177.8

290,397.31
2,338,132.1

Developed
economies

Flow
Stock

595,283.85
4,246,309.8

442,447.63
4,866,401.1

361,264.92
5,997,833.2

414,186.32
7,070,737.8

Transition
economies

Flow
Stock

9,724.9883
88,054.662

11,292.724
115,440.93

19,900.638
15,4398.65

30,308.416
198,930.77

2005

2006

2007

2008

329,291.5
2,722,292

433,763.66
3,363,925.4

529,344.21
4,393,354.3

620,733.33
4,275,982

613,089.34
7,055,164.2

972,762.25
8,645,261.7

1,358,627.6
10,591,083

962,258.67
10,212,893

30,948.232
273,428.67

54,548.218
395,251.51

Source: World Investment Report 2009, statistics available at http://stats.unctad.org

90,866.085
676,060.67

114,361.19
420,413.93

There are several basic features in the provisions of a BIT, including the
definition of investments, standard of treatments (fair and equitable treatment,
national treatment, and most favored nations), repatriation of profits, and
expropriation and compensation.18 The latter issues play an important role as
far as public interest is concerned. BITs are considered to have reinvigorated the
customary international law of “prompt, adequate, and effective” compensation
over nationalization, also known as the “Hull Rule”.19 However, following the
movement of decolonialisation in the post World War-II era, the newly established
states strongly opposed its status as customary international law and felt no
legal obligation to comply with such.20 Having considered the afore context, the
emergence of BITs which have again incorporated the compensation principle
similar to that of the Hull Rule. The emergence of BIT’s have as well placed
strong protection toward foreign investors arguably swinging the international
legal path back to its conservative tradition.
While the issue of compensation rule has perhaps been settled with BITs
as de facto multilateral agreement on investment,21 the present focus as to the
matter has now shifted to the expanding character of expropriation that also
covers indirect expropriation, mostly in the form of government regulations or
policies. BITs contain brief and general indirect expropriation provisions which
focus on the effect of the government action and do not address the distinction
between compensable and non-compensable regulatory actions.22  
These intricate one to qualify the general international law definition
of indirect expropriation and requires one to decide any issue on a case-bycase basis. Those depend on the specific wording of the relevant treaty, such
as “measures of expropriation or nationalisation or any other measures
the effect of which would be direct or indirect dispossession” or “any direct or
indirect measure” or “any other measure having the same nature or the same
2004).

18

M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, (Cambridge University Press,

See Sornarajah, supra note 18, Guzman, supra note 11, and Andrew Newcombe and Lluis Paradell,
Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standard of Treatment, (Kluwer Law International, 2009).
20
The strongest opposition came from the Government of Mexico. Three United Nations (UN)
General Assembly (GA) Resolutions that stress out the opposition are the Resolution 1803 on Permanent
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources G.A. res. 1803 (XVII), 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.17) at 15, U.N. Doc.
A/5217 (1962); Resolution 3171 on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources G.A. res. 3171 (XXVIII),
28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.30) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974); and Resolution 3201 on New International
Economic Order G.A. res. 3201 (VI), 6 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
21
Chalamish, supra note 7.
22
See OECD, supra note 1.
19
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effect against investments” or “having effect equivalent to nationalisation or
expropriation” or “any other measure or series of measures, direct or indirect,
tantamount to expropriation (including the levying of taxation, the compulsory
sale of all or part of an investment, or the impairment or deprivation of its
management, control of economic value…”23 Further, growing number of
cases and jurisprudences concerning indirect expropriation (and in particular
environmental regulations) are centered on the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) Chapter 11 on Investment. It is of particular relevance to
discuss and compare the development of the issues in the NAFTA context, which
in Article 1110 of the Agreement stipulates that:
“No Party may directly or indirectly nationalise or expropriate an investment
of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount
to nationalisation or expropriation of such an investment, except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105 (1)15 and
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with [subsequent paragraphs
specifying valuation of expropriations and form and procedure of
payment]”

As a response to the growing concern about the importance of
regulatory discretion, especially with regard to the state’s right to pursue
social and environmental objectives, and in addition to the growing number of
jurisprudence in investor-state dispute in this matter, there have been trends
to incorporate provisions that cover broader scope of protection. The US Free
Trade Agreements (FTAs) concluded with Australia,24 Chile,25 Central America,26  
and Morocco,27 refer to the US Model BIT 2004,28 incorporated the following
provisions:
“The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party, in a
specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a caseby-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors;
(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that
an action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the
economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish
that an indirect expropriation has occurred;
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct,
reasonable, investment-backed expectations; and
(iii) the character of the government action.”

Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties, (Brill, 1995), p. 99-100.
US-Australia Free Trade Agreement, signed on 1 March 2004 (see Annex 11-B).
The US-Chile Free Trade Agreement, signed on 6 June 2003 (see Annex 10-D).
26
US-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), signed on 28 January 2004 (see Annex 10C). The Central American countries are: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
27
US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, signed on 15 June 2004 (see Annex 10-B).
28
For the text of the model BIT see http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf
(last access 2 August 2010).
23
24
25
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In addition, the agreements also address the right to regulate as follows:
“Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by
a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare
objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment, do not
constitute indirect expropriations.”

The updated 2004 version of Canada’s model Foreign Investment
Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA) apparently contains the exact
similar wordings as that of the above US 2004 Model BIT, as far as indirect
expropriation and regulatory discretion are concerned.29  
One revolutionary BIT proposal was offered by Norway, which draft
was issued to the public in 2007 until finally revoked in 2009 due to failure to
gain enough public support.30 The draft moved beyond the standard investor
protection to include other goals of corporate social responsibility, human rights
commitments, anti-corruption efforts, sustainable development, and “the basic
principles of transparency, accountability and legitimacy for all participants in
foreign investment processes”.31 Regulations could have been enacted to set aside
investor protection under broad basis of exceptions, including public morals
and public orders; human, animal, or plant life or health; national treasures of
artistic, history, or archaeological value; protection of environment; financial
system prudence; international peace and security; and linguistic heritage and
cultural diversity.32
a. Relevant Cases
The changing trends toward broader exceptions in BIT are mainly driven
by the enormous high profile investor-state disputes concerning public interest
regulations and at present many foreign investors still resort this forum to
channel their interests.
One of particular relevance to environmental protection issue is that
between a Spanish firm Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. (Tecmed),
against the Government of Mexico adjudicated under the ICSID forum pursuant
to the Spain-Mexico BIT. The issues were related to Tecmed’s investment in a
waste landfill to operate a hazardous waste confinement facility in Hermosillo,
which Tecmed alleged to have lost in 1998 due to non renewal of the necessary
licenses by the Mexican government. The Tribunal eventually found that Mexico’s
actions indeed constituted expropriation and also violated its ‘fair and equitable
treatment’ obligation.33  

29
For the text of the new FIPA model and the list of countries with which Canada has entered into
contract, see http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/
index.aspx (last access 25 July 2010).
30
Damon Vis-Dunbar, “Norway shelves its draft model bilateral investment treaty”, 8 June 2009,
http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2009/06/08/norway-shelves-its-proposedmodel-bilateral-investment-treaty.aspx (last access 25 July 2010).
31
Investment Treaty News (ITN), March 27, 2008, www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/itn_mar27_2008.pdf  
(last access 25 July 2010).
32
For the complete provisions, see the Norwegian Model Agreement for the Protection and
Promotion of Investments (Section 5- Exceptions) http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/NorwayModel2007.
doc  (last access 25 July 2010).
33
Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States (ICSID Award Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2)
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In Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena SA (CDSE) vs. Republic of Costa
Rica, similar environmental measures on the extension of Santa Rosa National
Park to preserve rare species were adjudicated, but not so much in terms of
determining the legality of the act, (the fact of expropriation as such was not in
dispute), but rather in the methodology for valuing the environmental resource
– in this case an area of rain forest which is rich in biological diversity.34
Until recently the similar type of disputes still gain public attention.
In Unglaube vs. Government of Costa Rica,35 a German investor registered a
request for arbitration on November 2009 in ICSID under the German-Costa
Rica BIT. The Government of Costa Rica has refused to extend the appropriate
permits for the eco-tourism hotel projects, although it was already declared as
“nature friendly” in 1992, citing its danger to the extinction of the leatherback
turtle species. Further, Phillip Morris International (PMI) is currently facing the
Government of Uruguay in measures concerning public health.36 PMI, having its
headquarter in Switzerland, in May 2010 initiated an ICSID arbitration against
Uruguay under the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT over new rules requiring that
80% of cigarette pack surfaces be devoted to graphic warnings of the dangers
associated with smoking, and limits tobacco companies to marketing only one
type of cigarette per brand, which law prevents them from marketing “light” or
“mild” cigarettes.
However, most landmark cases have been decided under the NAFTA
tribunals, which make them relevant to be discussed herein.
In October 1996, Metalclad Corporation, a US waste-disposal company,
accused the Mexican government of violating Chapter 11 of NAFTA when the
local government of San Luis Potosi refused their local subsidiary a license to
re-open a waste disposal facility. The State Governor ordered the site closedown after a geological audit found the facility would contaminate the local
water supply. Special NAFTA tribunal, operating under the rules of the World
Bank’s International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
Additional Facility Rules, awarded Metalclad $16,685,000 in August 2000, and
finally in June 2001 the parties reached a settlement of US$15.6 million.37
In 1997 the US chemicals giant, Ethyl Corp, used NAFTA Chapter 11 to
sue the Canadian government for a ban imposed on Methylcyclopentadienyl
Manganese Tricarbonyl (MMT), a gasoline additive designed to prevent
automobile engine from knocking produced by Ethyl, because it was toxic and
hazardous to public health. Ethyl sued the Canadian government for US$250
million. In June 1998, the Canadian government withdrew environmental
legislation banning MMT, and paid Ethyl Corp US$13 million to settle the case.38
34
Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, (ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1;
17 February 2000).
35
Fernando Cabrera Diaz, “German investor launches ICSID case against Costa Rica over alleged
expropriation of land near endangered turtle habitat”, http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/
news/archive/2009/12/04/german-investor-launches-icsid-case-against-costa-rica-over-allegedexpropriation-of-land-near-endangered-turtle-habitat.aspx (last access 1 August 2010).
36
Fernando Cabrera Diaz, “Philip Morris initiates arbitration against Uruguay over new labeling
requirements, taxes” http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2010/05/11/philipmorris-initiates-arbitration-against-uruguay-over-new-labeling-requirements-taxes.aspx (last access 1
August 2010).
37
Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States (NAFTA Tribunal Decision 30 August 2000).
38
Ethyl Corporation v. Canada (NAFTA Tribunal Preliminary Award on Jurisdiction, 24 June
1998).
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Moreover, S.D. Myers, Inc. (SDMI), a US company engaged in treatment
of Polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) alleged Canada for violating NAFTA Chapter
11 by banning the export of PCB waste to the US. In 1980 the U.S. closed the
border for the movement of PCB waste, but in the fall of 1995 SDMI was granted
permission to import PCB from Canada. Promptly after this, Canada issued a
regulation prohibiting the export of PCB waste to the U.S. thus disqualifying
SDMI, and its Canadian investment, from carrying out its intended business.39
One case in which the decision went against the foreign investor was
one of Methanex vs. USA, rendered in 2005. In its suit, Methanex claimed that
the MTBE ban was disguised protectionism pushed by its competitor through
campaign contributions. However, the tribunal found that the ban was enacted
for a legitimate public purpose, pursuant to extensive public debate, sound
scientific opinion and in accordance with due legislative process.40
These disputes have contributed to the development of investment
jurisprudence to dissect and determine what constitutes legitimate public
interest regulations that justify indirect expropriations.
First is the degree of interference of property, which means how severe the
economic impact is. In S.D. Myers, the Tribunal distinguished regulation from
expropriation primarily on the basis of the degree of interference with property
rights: “expropriations tend to involve the deprivation of ownership rights;
regulations [are] a lesser interference”.41  Duration of regulation also plays a role
in S.D. Myers, as the Tribunal concluded that Canada’s initiative “was only valid
for a time” and thus “an opportunity was delayed” but no indirect expropriation
could be found.42
More controversial issue arises as to whether the consideration should
only take the economic impact (known as the “sole effect doctrine”) into
account or the political motive (public choice analysis) of the regulation as
well. In Metalclad, the Tribunal stated that it “need not decide or consider the
motivation, nor intent of the adoption of the Ecological Decree”.43 In CDSE, the
panel expressly stated that the environmental purpose had no bearing on the
issue of compensation.44
These considerations are related to the purpose and the context of the
regulation, as to whether the recognition of the “social purpose” or “general
welfare” makes a difference in determining whether takings have taken
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, (NAFTA Tribunal, Partial Award, 13 November 2000).
Methanex v. United States (NAFTA Tribunal Final Decision, 3 August 2005).
41
S.D. Myers, supra note 39. The Tribunal states: “the distinction between expropriation and
regulation screens out most potential cases of complaints concerning economic intervention by a state and
reduces the risk that governments will be subject to claims as they go about their business of managing
public affairs”.
42
S.D. Myers, supra note 39.
43
Metalclad, supra note 37.
44
CDSE, supra note 34. The arbitration panel declares that “while an expropriation or taking
for environmental reasons may be classified as a taking for a public purpose, and thus be legitimate, the
fact that the property was taken for this reason does not affect either the nature or the measure of the
compensation to be paid for the taking. That is, the purpose of protecting the environment for which the
Property was taken does not alter the legal character of the taking for which adequate compensation must
be paid. The international source of the obligation to protect the environment makes no difference”.
Further it is added: “Expropriatory environmental measures – no matter how laudable and
beneficial to society as a whole – are, in this respect, similar to any other expropriatory measures that a
state may take in order to implement its policies: where property is expropriated, even for environmental
purposes, whether domestic or international, the state’s obligation to pay compensation remains”.
39
40
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place. In S.D. Myers, “require a tribunal to look at the substance of what has
occurred and not only at form. A tribunal should not be deterred by technical
or facial considerations from reaching a conclusion... It must look at the real
interests involved and the purpose and effect of the government measure”.45
In Tecmed,46 in addition to economic analysis and proportionality test (there
must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the charge or
weight imposed upon the foreign investor and the aim sought to be realized
by any expropriatory measure), it confirmed the irrelevance of the regulatory
motives.47  At the same time, Tecmed recognized the importance of commonlyaccepted police-power doctrine, although decided that the Mexican regulation
in question did not fall into the category.48  
Final element identified is whether the governmental measure affects
the investor’s reasonable expectations. In these cases the investor has to prove
that his/her investment was based on a state of affairs that did not include the
challenged regulatory regime. The claim must be objectively reasonable and
not based entirely upon the investor’s subjective expectations. In Tecmed,
the Tribunal determined whether the Mexican government’s measures were
“reasonable with respect to their goals, the deprivation of economic rights and
the legitimate expectations of who suffered such deprivation”.49
The Benefit Revisited : Economic Framework of Bilateral Investment
Treaties

As explained above, this paper does not seek the optimal level of a
benevolence regulation that falls outside the scope of regulatory expropriation
or develop a new formula to determine one. Rather, it presents the question
on under what condition the optimal level may emerge in the complex global
network of BITs. This is to assume that relaxing the exception requirements
in BITs that provide more rooms for government regulations is more efficient
and incur joint surplus for both parties. The analysis will focus on the incentive
structures of the BIT signatories, as well as the cost and benefit associated with
signing one.
1. Theoretical Economic Framework of BITs

a. Obsolesce Bargaining or Obsolesce Theory?
BITs arise out of the classical commitment problem between a foreign
trader (or a foreign investor for this matter) and a ruler. However, while the
S.D. Myers, supra note 39.
Tecmed, supra note 33.
47
Tecmed, supra note 33, points out that “under international law, the owner is also deprived of
property where the use or enjoyment of benefits related thereto is exacted or interfered with to a similar
extent, even where legal ownership over the assets in question is not affected, and so long as the deprivation
is not temporary. The government’s intention is less important than the effects of the measure [i.e. the
economic value of the use, enjoyment or disposition of the assets or rights affected by the administrative
action or decision have been neutralized or destroyed] on the owner of the assets or on the benefits arising
from such assets affected by the measures; and the form of the deprivation measure is less important than
its actual effects.”
48
Tecmed, supra note 33 further stipulates that “the principle that the State’s exercise of its
sovereign power within the framework of its police power may cause economic damage to those subject to
its powers as administrator without entitling them to any compensation whatsoever is undisputable”.
49
Tecmed, supra note 33.
45
46
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traditional institutional solutions place heavy role on the reputation of the ruler,
as for the case of the Medieval Merchant Guilds,50 BITs offer unique enforcement
mechanisms that constitute the ruler’s “credible commitment” for foreign
investors by ensuring that the ruler would not break pre-investment promises
once the investment has been made.51 BITs, adequately safeguard the investor
against host states’ actions that would adversely impact the profitability of the
investment, since it is equipped with direct investor-state dispute resolution
mechanisms and compensation for expropriation.
Formally the underlying model is known as the Obsolescing Bargaining
Mechanism (OBM).52 This theory views that foreign investors have relatively
more ex ante bargaining power prior to an investment being made because of
their mobility that they can invest wherever the resources exist, as opposed to
the host states which depend on immobilized and given certain endowment
factors, say natural resources or intensive labors.  Foreign investors in general,
yet this depend on the nature of investment, can offer the host state capital,
management know-how, marketing skills, advanced technology and access to
export markets.53 The host state’s bargaining chip include its market size and
growth prospects, access to cheap and/or highly skilled labor, natural resources,
infrastructure, and an investor-friendly regulatory regime.54
This early advantage would however shift in favor of host states’ ex post
benefit, because once the capital is injected, it would be locked-in inside that
particular country’s territory, as if a “hostage”55, for a long period,  because FDI is
mostly on a long-term basis. As such the host states can commit any action to lever
up its position to gain more advantage, from raising the tax level to expropriating
the investor’s property.56 The investors’ advantages thus obsolesce over time.
Even with due observance of the host states’ needs for capital investment, they
would have an incentive to make those promises necessary to bring investors in,
but once the sunk costs are made, the host then deliver the incentive only to the
level that will keep the investor from leaving.
Besides, there is also a paradox that the greater the foreign investors’
assets used as bargaining chip ex ante, the greater liability they would possess in
the ex-post investment phase. While foreign investors might succeed in getting
a favorable initial deal, the agreement might not last for long if immobile fixed
assets are involved. In countries where the risk of expropriation (including
indirect expropriation) is high, the host government’s inclination to violate
contracts increases in line with the degree of asset specificity;57 which makes

50
See Avner Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade
(Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions), (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
51
Guzman, supra note 11.
52
Vernon, supra note 13.
53
See Jo Jakobsen, “Does Democracy Moderate the Obsolescing Bargaining Mechanism? An
Empirical Analysis 1983-2001”, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20063a3_en.pdf (last
access 20 July 2010). See also Nathan Fagre and Louis T. Wells, “Bargaining Power of Transnationals
and Host Governments”, 13 Journal of International Business Studies, 13(1982), p. 9-23; Sushil Vachani,
“Enhancing the Obsolescing Bargain Theory: A Longitudinal Study of Foreign Ownership of U.S. and
European Transnationals”, 26 Journal of International Business Studies 1 (1995), p. 159-180.
54
Jakobsen, supra note 53; and John H. Dunning, “Location and the Multinational Enterprise: A
Neglected Factor?”, 29 Journal of International Business Studies 1 (1998), p. 45-66.
55
See the analogy of the “Ugly Princess” to overcome the problem of credible commitment during
the Middle Ages in Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, (Free Press, 1998).
56
Fagre and Wells, supra note 54; Vachani, supra note 54.
57
Williamson, supra note 55.
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investments, involving large sunk costs or specific investments, a particularly
risky activity.58 BITs supposedly serve to overcome this problem by providing
an institutional safeguard that prevents such opportunistic behavior of the host
states.
Despite its logical modeling, the theory fails to take into account more
complex reality in foreign investment dynamics.
Firstly, the model assumes that the final objectives of foreign investors
and potential host states are always contradictory, as not always is the case in
the real world. The many test studies suggest that foreign investors were able to
retain relative bargaining power and prevent opportunistic behavior conducted
by host states. In fact, the competition among potential host states to attract
foreign investors has shifted their policy and treatment of foreign investors from
“red tape” to “red carpet” and from expropriation to liberalization.59
Secondly, the theory views investor-state relations as a single one-shot
relationship and thus discounts the risk-reducing role of reputational concerns.60  
In fact, when deciding where to invest foreign investors typically pay particular
attention to the experiences of past and existing investors.61 “Unfavorable host
state behavior is likely to have strong ripple effects beyond the investment
immediately affected, as other existing investors withdraw from the host state,
and as potential investors redraw their investment plans.”62
Thirdly, the model assumes that all relevant parties have similar
characteristics in nature. As a single entity, foreign investor is interested solely in
maximizing investment returns. Meanwhile, government as the entity that serves
and aggregates interests of their stakeholders have more complex preferences, as
reflected by various pressure groups.63 The relationship between host states and
foreign investors is therefore a dynamic one in which preferences and reactions
of many parties should be taken into consideration, and the outcome of an
investment must be distributed among them. It means that  it is again assumed
that all relevant parties can influence each others during the negotiation of the
contract, but once it is concluded, no more influence should be made but to
respond to the final agreement (either adherence or non-compliance). The later
sections will discuss about foreign investors’ ability to infiltrate into the host
states’ domestic political environment and become one of the domestic interest
groups.
58
David J. Teece, “Transaction Cost Economics and the Transnational Enterprise”, 7 Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization 7 (1986), p. 21-45.
59
Lorraine Eden and Stefanie Lenway, “From Obsolescing Bargain to the Political Bargaining Model”
in Robert Grosse (ed.), International Business and Government Relations in the 21st Century, (Cambridge
University Press, 2005). See also John H. Dunning, “Governments and Multinational Enterprises: From
Confrontation to Cooperation?”, In Lorraine Eden and Evan Potter (eds.), Multinationals in the Global
Political Economy, (Macmillan, 1993); Yadong Luo, “Toward a Cooperative View of MNC-host Government
Relations: Building Blocks and Performance Implications”, Journal of International Business Studies 32
(2001), p. 401-19; John M. Stopford, “The Growing Interdependence between Transnational Corporations
and Governments”, Transnational Corporations 3 (1994), p. 53-76.
60
The role of Reputation plays a pivotal role in any law-and-economics analysis of international
law. See Andrew T. Guzman, How International Law Works, (Oxford University Press: 2007).
61
Jason Webb Yackee, “Do BITs Really Work? Revisiting the Empirical Link Between Investment
Treaties and FDI”, in Karl P. Sauvant and Lisa Sachs, The Effect of Treaties on FDI: Bilateral Investment
Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows, (Oxford University Press, 2009).
62
Yackee, supra note 61.
63
Henisz and Zelner, supra note 14.
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Moreover, the model also employs skeptical views toward the quality of the
domestic institutions and the enforceability of the law in host states, or at least,
as having a “home court bias”.  BITs consequently guarantee certain standards of
treatment that can be enforced via binding investor-state arbitration detached
from any domestic judicial system and substitute weak legal institutions and
assist countries with high levels of political risk to attract FDI. It is then assumed
that countries with weak domestic property rights protection can increase their
competitiveness by committing themselves to respecting the property rights of
foreign investors. The riskier a country is, the more a BIT should work to attract
FDI. The logic follows that riskier countries tend to absorb more FDI inflows
when their commitments to protect investors are credible.
However, although the views about BITs capability to help at attracting
investment by serving as a commitment device and signal, - that protecting
property rights of the foreign investors are indisputable -, the credibility of this
signal will also be influenced by the quality of the domestic institutions, be it
of the legal system or of political stability affairs. This will be described later in
the subsequent section about the benefit of investment treaties from various
empirical studies.

b. Flexible Provisions and Credible Threat
The insights of contract economics into traditional legal analysis merge
the conventional ex-post analysis (say, rights and obligations of parties upon
violation of an agreement) and ex-ante decision analysis, discussing why and
under what circumstances parties enter into a contract in the first place. The
starting point for analysis is the notion of “complete contract”, when the parties
-assumed to have full rationality and perfect information- could draw up
contract without any contracting imperfections including bounded rationality
and unforeseeability, no transaction costs, and concluded in a perfect market
setting.
However, this type of contract is impossible to draft and very costly to even
try to come close at drafting one. Therefore, contracts will always be incomplete
that they will fail to discriminate the ex-post states of the world that optimally
call for different obligations.64 BITs are concluded to address problems that arise
out of the long-term characteristics of investment projects. BITs are therefore far
more fragile to uncertainty and exogenous shocks associated with investment
environment than standard business contract, in the sense of uncertainty about
the future (unforeseeability), uncertainty about the actions of the others players
(asymmetrical information) and uncertainty about the meaning and scope of
the contractual provisions (legal indeterminateness).65  
In order to be optimal, a contract must assess the mutual benefit of
the parties involved, being welfare enhancing in sum. That is to say that the
participation constraint must be met prior to concluding the contract. While
the ex-ante approach finds that contract must be rigid and definite to provide
security and prevent opportunistic behavior, the ex-post approach under the
64
Jean Tirole, “Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?”, 67 Econometrica 741 (1994) defines an
incomplete contract as one that “does not exhaust the contracting possibilities envisioned in the complete
contract”. For specific application in international law, see Robert E. Scott and Paul B. Stephan, The Limits of
Leviathan: Contract Theory and the Enforcement of International Law, (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
65
Anne Van Aaken, “International Investment Law between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract
Theory Analysis”, 12 Journal of International Economic Law 507 (2009).
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shadow of uncertainty must allow a room for modification and flexibility.
“Rigidity always hurts states since certain risks are shifted to them, whereas
flexibility usually hurts the investor since the risk allocation is on his side.”66 As
such, a welfare-enhancing BIT must decide a tradeoff between ex-ante security
and ex-post flexibility, as summarized below:
“A balance needs to be found between commitment and flexibility with the
following goals of the contract in mind: securing a high level of cooperation
ex ante, distinction between (desired) flexibility in relation to new
circumstances on the one hand and cases of purely opportunistic breach
of the contract ex post on the other and adequate compensation for the
victim.”67

In a complete contract, parties would maximize their ex-ante commitment,
because there is no assurance problem. The standard OBM model apparently
only considers one side of the analysis by ensuring the ex-ante incentive structure
for the host states to prevent their opportunistic behavior. However, the expost optimality is not perfectly addressed in the model, no matter whether the
contract is still value maximizing or not, after the entire future uncertainties
have been resolved as of the time of performance.
Without having careful evaluation of the ex-post side, all future risks and
uncertainties will be borne solely by the host states. The next issue would be
whether this situation is efficient, in the sense that host state is the superior
risk-bearer, and foreign investors will be exempted from any risk responsibility.
While this question requires further in-depth analysis, which then require to
incorporate other international and private institutions handling investment
risks such as Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) or governmental
guaranty companies such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC)68. Assigning the risks only to the host states does generate several
economic issues.
BITs could turn into over-insurance scheme for foreign investors that
might in turn suffer from the problem of moral hazard.69 If a foreign investor
recognizes that its project will always be compensated from any regulation, it
might excessively invest because its private actions that diminish the value of
social or environmental conditions would always be externalized to the host
state. Foreign investors can also have “accounting illusion” that will affect their
financial analysis over the costs and benefits associated with certain projects.
Some projects will always be considered to be profitable because they do not
take the social costs into the assessment.
66
Van Aaken, supra note 65. The move towards the balance of interest between host states and
foreign investors has been discussed intensively among scholars. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, “The Necessity
of Sustainable Development?”, in Marie-Claire Cordonnier Seger, Markus Gehring and Andrew Newcombe
(eds.), Sustainable Development in World Investment Law, (Kluwer Law International, forthcoming
2009/2010); Andrea K. Bjorklund, “Emergency Exceptions: State of Necessity and Force Majeure” in Peter
Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment
Law, (Oxford University Press, 2008).
67
Van Aaken, supra note 65.
68
See Witold J. Henisz, “Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment”, 16 Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization 2 (2000), p. 334-364; Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen, “Political Risk Insurance and
Bilateral Investment Treaties: A View From Below”, Columbia FDI Perspectives, No. 27, August 2, 2010.
69
Louis Kaplow, “An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions”, 99 Harvard Law Review 511 (1986).

No. 1 - Volume 2, May - August 2011

INDONESIA Law Review

~ 84 ~

While the abovementioned application of contract economics to
investment treaties generates valuable input, the proponent concludes that
having overly strict rigidity, without allowing for adequate flexibility, may lead to
reactions by states that may threaten the system as a whole. Thereby, it leads to
the ultimately perverse result of less protection for FDI in the long run. This is to
assume that if states feel that they have no voice they might exit the system.70  
The problem with this conclusion is that it is based on the assumption
that host states can invoke credible threat to quit the system or violate the BIT.
A threat is credible when it is rational and within one’s best interest to do so.
When circumstances surrounding BIT change, the host state might consider
breaching as more attractive than performing. A credible threat serves as a
basis for efficient breach, namely when the party (in this case the host state) will
breach a contract and pay damages, if the party considered it would be more
economically efficient than performing under the BIT.71 Besides, when the threat
is credible, the host state may induce the counterpart to modify the original
agreement. If the new circumstances are such that performance under the
original terms would come to involve a loss for one party, his demand for better
terms is viewed more favorably, and the resulting modification is more likely to
be enforced.72 International law doctrines which can be invoked in this context
is necessity pursuant to a change in circumstances or “rebus sic stantibus.”73
There are two foundations -in international law in general and the network
of BITs in particular- that make credible threat not credible, As such, the threat
to exit the system as proposed does not hold up.
One element of international law left out in the previous analysis is the
importance of reputation, upon which the entire international legal system is
built. Reputation works in a very simple way: if a state breaches its international
legal obligation, its future commitment to compliance with international
circles will lack credibility.74 Should one ignore the importance of reputation in
international sphere, the analysis will fail to comprehend many international
legal phenomena. Reputation works however only if there is a common and
shared perception and evaluation over an action.75 When a state violates BIT
under the consideration that the BIT does not incur joint maximizing benefit
to its side, the reputation generated in the international community does not
necessarily take on its side. It can gain support from other states, but it can also
hamper the state’s future international exchange although its action is based on
solid economic reasoning.
In addition, particularly in the context of BITs, it has been discussed that
BITs do not serve only as a device that provides security for foreign investors per
se, but also as commitment device that signals a state’s overall preferences in
the global economic exchange.76 The role of private international firms such as
Van Aaken, supra note 65.
Oren Bar-Gil and Omri Ben-Shahar, “Threatening an Irrational Breach of Contract”, Michigan Law
and Economics Research Paper No. 02-016 (2002).
72
Bar-Gil and Ben-Shahar, supra note 71.
73
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 27 January
1980, UN Doc. A/Conf.39/27; 1155 UNTS 331; 8 ILM 679 (1969); 63 AJIL 875 (1969).
74
Guzman, supra note 60.
75
Greif, supra note 50.
76
See Jenifer Tobin and Susan Rose-Ackerman, “When BITs Have Some Bite: the Political Economic
Environment for Bilateral Investment Treaties” (2006), as the result is summarized in Tobin and RoseAckerman, “Do BITs Benefit Developing Countries?” in Roger P. Alford and Catherine Rogers (eds.), The
Future of Investment Arbitration, (Oxford University Press, 2009); Ginsburg, supra note 15; Kenneth
70
71

No. 1 - Volume 2, May - August 2011

INDONESIA Law Review

~ 85 ~

political risk assessment consultancies, credit ratings agencies, and international
development agents can help shaping perceptions as to one circumstance.77 In
other words, investment treaty signals a country’s commitment and reputation
in the global market in general. The perception of which will affect also its
participation in the global trade flows, international financial market, and even
signals a country’s political stability. This incurs highly inefficient reputational
costs for an efficient breach to prevail. Potential host states have relatively weaker
bargaining power to influence the result of the negotiation (and renegotiation),
thus the capital exporting states can de facto unilaterally determine the structure
of an investment treaty.
For example, so far Bolivia has announced its withdrawal from ICSID
Convention and incorporated in its Constitution a prohibition of resource to
foreign tribunals or jurisdictions in certain investment sectors,78 while Ecuador
followed in the termination of BITs with eight Latin and Central American
countries as well as withdrawal for matters related to natural resources
adjudicated before ICSID effective as of January 2010,79 and Venezuela withdrew
from the Venezuela-Netherlands BIT.80 Their actions were influenced by domestic
political and ideological preferences and arguably did not impact the global
investment network as a whole.81 In conclusion, the pretext of credible threat is
not as credible as one would expect in the context of the global network of BITs.
c. Observation and Verification of Social and Environmental Objectives
It has been discussed above that long-term investments are always fragile
to the uncertainty in the future. As far as social and environmental problems
are concerned, the uncertainty is associated not only to the predictability and
observability of an event that produces social and environmental problems, but
also to the verifiability of such an event.
Most of the changes of circumstances related to social and environmental
problems are not the results of exogenous shocks, but due to new discovery on the
observability of certain issues. Say, emissions derived from oil and gas industry
or coal mining have always been considered as sources of pollution, but when
the threat of global warming started to emerge, the valuation of the costs of such
pollution increased because they pose environmental dangers more than one
have expected before. Another example is the existence of leatherback turtle,
which plays a central role in ICSID dispute of Unglaube vs. Government of Costa
Rica under the German-Costa Rica BIT. The species is the largest of all living sea

Vandevelde, “The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties”, 41 Harvard International Law Journal 470,
490 (2000).
77
Global market perceptions are heavily influenced by various business actors that supply
information to the actors, including credit rating agencies which already include political risk, country risk
ratings, as well as various reports and indexes published by the World Bank and other private institutions.
78
“Bolivia Submits a Notice under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention”, 16 May 2007, http://icsid.
worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=Announcem
entsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement3  (last access 23 July 2010).
79
“Ecuador Submits a Notice under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention”, 9 July 2009, http://icsid.
worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=Announcem
entsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement20 (last access 23 July 2010).
80
“Venezuela surprises the Netherlands with termination notice for BIT; treaty has been used
by many investors to “route” investments into Venezuela”, 16 May 2008, http://www.iareporter.com/
articles/20091001_93 (last access 23 July 2010).
81
See UNCTAD World Investment Report 2010, published 22 July 2010, http://www.unctad.org/
Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=5535&lang=1 (last access 1 August 2010).
No. 1 - Volume 2, May - August 2011

INDONESIA Law Review

~ 86 ~

turtles and the fourth largest modern reptiles in the world, but specifically in
Costa Rica, it is later observed that its population becomes endangered. In other
words, what is previously not observable can become observable in the future
also because of changes in technology and the ways of observation.
The bigger problems of uncertainty in social and environmental issues
are one of uncertainty resulting from verifiability, even when the circumstances
can already be determined. Many environmental problems are simply difficult to
verify, thus rigid provisions in BITs narrows the room for discretionary judgment
and limits differences in opinion. Lack of full scientific uncertainty mostly is the
underlying problem, as acknowledged in the recognition of the precautionary
principle.82 The European Commission Communication on the Precautionary
Principle also notes that “[t]he precautionary principle applies where scientific
evidence is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and preliminary scientific
evaluation indicates that there are reasonable grounds for concern that the
potentially dangerous effects on the environment, human, animal or plant
health may be inconsistent with the high level of protection chosen by the EU.”83
This is to emphasize the difficulties in determining the nature and the level of
an environmental problem. That said, in event of insufficient, inconclusive, or
uncertain scientific evaluation, no third parties including jurists (adjudicators
or arbitrators) or expert panels (technical experts or scientists) would be able
to reach a certain conclusion to verify the uncertainty even when the condition
already emerges.
As far as investor-state dispute is concerned, the most relevant
uncertainties are ones over effect. They are reflected in various ongoing
debates and legal disputes in the international, regional, and national level.
The debate over the economic impact of climate change represents the classic
instance of these uncertainties. Environmental economists have long debated
the economic effect of climate change ranging from the Stern Commission,84 to
Lomborg,85 to Nordhaus,86 to Mendelsohn,87 and so forth. Suppose in response
to the assessment developed by the Stern Commission which advocates sharp
and immediate reductions on greenhouse gas emissions, Indonesia -a state with
extensive rainforest that covers more than 15% of the global share- decides to
suspend all natural resources licenses promised to the mining and extractive
industry firms.88 The contract will be annulled, and parties must return to the
82
See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development of 1992, “[i]n order to protect the
environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as
a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” http://www.unep.
org/Documents.multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163 (last access 10 July 2010).
83
Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, http://ec.europa.eu/
environment/docum/20001_en.htm (last access 10 July 2010).
84
Nicholas Stern, “The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change”, HM Treasury, London
(2006).
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Bjorn Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World, (Cambridge
University Press, 2001).
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William D. Nordhaus, “A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change”, “A
Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate”, 45 Journal of Economic Literature 3 (2007), p.
686–702.
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Robert O. Mendelsohn, “A Critique of the Stern Report”, 29 Regulation 4 (2006-2007), p. 42-46.
88
The issue of large-scale crop-estates and open-pit mining in Indonesia’s protected forests and
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stock. Pressure from international NGOs have called for suspending and terminating the existing contracts.
Fore general overview, see Toni Johnson, “Deforestation and Greenhouse-Gas Emissions”, Council on
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initial condition prior to the conclusion of the agreement. On the other hand,
those firms argue that the measures are not economically justified by citing
other studies to show that gradual -instead of sharp and immediate reductionsare sufficient to address the problem, and therefore, existing contracts must be
respected.  Determining the level of uncertainty will come down to debates over
scientific results, and rigid provisions in BIT, or any contract for that matter, will
not be optimal from an ex-post perspective.

d. Strategic Behavior
Analysis of strategic behavior of the potential host states, related to the
choice between preference over strict provisions and flexible provisions, are
developed upon the previous model of Guzman when analyzing the choice
one must made between the “appropriate compensation” and that of “prompt,
adequate, and effective” as mostly found in BITs.89 The structure is developed to
provide a prisoner’s dilemma model between potential host states that prevent
collective action for demanding flexible provisions in BIT negotiation.
Several elements are modified herein. This situation assumes two
possible alternative structures of an investment treaty. The first is the one that
incorporates more flexibility to regulate social and environmental matters,
and the other being one that incorporates strict requirement. If one only
considers the economy of the host states, concluding a BIT with strict provision
and less flexibility is inefficient,90 and they would be better off by not signing
one. However, the host states also realize that the capital-exporting countries
prefer BIT with strict provisions to the flexible ones because it provides more
security and protection for their investors. It is also assumed that host states
are competing for limited capital from the capital-exporting countries,91 in the
sense that one’s decision to allow more investment inflow to its country comes
at the expense of the other potential host states as competitors. A country that
signs BIT will have more institutional advantage over the ones that do not do
so. Therefore, collectively potential host states are better off with forming a
collusion not to sign BIT. However, individually, each has the incentive to attract
capital and sign BIT.  
Following Guzman’s model, the framework of choice will be designed as a
symmetric prisoner’s dilemma of a one-shot game between two potential host
states, as they can choose between cooperate (C) among each other by agreeing
not to sign BIT and defect (D) by signing one while the other does not. Two
conditions for the framework are:
• It is required that each player ranks her outcomes as follows:
DC > CC > DD > CD
• CC ≥ DC + CD
2
This is to make sure that mixed strategies are irrelevant.

Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/14919/deforestation_and_greenhousegas_emissions.
html, 21 December 2009, (last access 15 July 2010).
89
Sornarajah, supra note 18, Guzman, supra note 11. See Sub-section B.I.
90
Van Aaken, supra note 65. See Sub-section C.I.2.
91
Guzman, supra note 11; Cristoph Engel, “Governments in Dilemma: A Game Theoretic Model
for the Conclusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties”, (University of St. Gallen Law and Economics Research
Paper Series No. 2007-22, 2007).
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The pay-offs matrix of the modified model is illustrated below:
Prisoner 1
No BIT
BIT

No BIT
4, 4

Prisoner 2

6,  0

Where 6 > 4 > 2 > 0

BIT

0,  6
2, 2

In a theoretical fashion, the only possible alternative to encounter this
issue is that the potential host states establish cooperation among them to deny
any offer made by capital exporting states that still incorporates strict provision.
This would supposedly eliminate capital exporting states’ ex ante benefit prior to
treaty conclusion, being the advantage of choosing the most suitable country to
invest its capital in. Should all potential host states stop competing against each
other for the capital and start imposing the same conditions in the investment
treaty negotiation, capital exporting states would have no alternative but to
accept their offer.
However, no cooperation, coordination, arrangements, alliances, or any
action for that matter ever appears in practice. At present there are recent trends
of the proliferation of South-South BITs (BITs between developing countries,
pursuant to which the fundamental assumption of “competing for capital” theory
for rational of signing a BIT must be reframed), in addition to the increasing
number of Economic Integration and Investment Agreements (EIIAs) concluded
also between developing countries.92 These international agreements, however,
do not cover rights and obligations over third party (capital-exporting country)
and does not provide new institutional platform for cooperation.
High transaction costs can be associated with this dilemma. There should
be substantially high number of potential host states for this cooperation to be
effective, yet it would take only one country to defect in order to start the domino
effect that would motivate other countries to defect as well. Suppose there are
10 potential host states, all of which have agreed to offer flexible provisions
as non-negotiable clause in a BIT negotiation. Transaction costs will cover the
negotiation costs and enforcement costs among all 10 of them. However, once
one state defects, the others have the impulse also to defect, creating such costly
cooperation very fragile to single defection, as the maintenance costs are ten
times higher than the value it needs for starting defection.
2. Benefit of BITs: Summing Up Empirical Studies

Proponents of BITs remain convinced that the instruments have generated
significant benefit, as such, any modifications (of incorporating non-economic
interests such as environmental objectives) can hamper their designated
purposes. This sub-section compiles various empirical works on BITs and
concludes that BITs matter only if complemented by good domestic institutions
92
Stephania Bonilla and Rosa Castro, “A Law-and-Economics Analysis of International Investment
Agreements: Latin America”, (Second Annual Conference of Societa Italiana di Diritto ed Economia 20-21
October 2006).
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perceived by foreign investors. The findings also negate the other extreme
arguments supporting the views that BITs have very little impact.93  
The real economic benefit of signing an investment treaty, especially for
potential host states, remains debatable among economists and scholars. Many
past empirical works on the economic significance of the growing number of
BITs has produced contradictory findings concerning their impact on FDI.
Meanwhile, the answer to this issue serves as an important foundation to analyze
the bargaining power and power structure between the potential host states
countries and the capital exporting states in investment treaty negotiations.
If BITs do not have any significant impact on FDI, any effort to negotiate (and
renegotiate) more flexible public interest provision, whatever the cost is, would
then not justify the benefit.
Several respected findings will be introduced below to frame the empirical
economic context. It is then concluded that these conflicting results are merely the
result of neglecting the important political-economic backgrounds of concluding
BITs.94 This argument supports the standing of the article that domestic political
institutions matter in the structure of an international investment treaty.
Neumayer and Spess develop highly regarded and very robust empirical
evidence with sophisticated methodology to suggest that developing countries
enjoy potentially massive increases in FDI -up to 93%- when signing BITs. Using
components of the political risk index developed by the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG), they find that a country with relatively lower institutional
quality benefits more from BITs.95 This finding conforms with the theory that BITs
act as a substitute rather than a complement to the lower institutional quality of
a country. Further, Salacuse and Sullivan conducted a cross-sectional empirical
analysis on the impacts of US BITs and OECD BITs in developing countries.
They found a strong positive relationship between BITs and FDI from the US to
developing countries, but BITs with OECD countries are not significant.96
By contrast, using a different set of models and assumptions, HallwardDriemeier finds little evidence of this connection, that BITs play a minor role in
stimulating greater FDI, and pursuant to which, BITs act more as complements
than substitutes for good institutional quality and domestic property rights
protection. Using 20 years of bilateral FDI flows from twenty OECD countries
to 31 developing countries, the research finds that BITs are only effective in
countries which are already in possession of high quality institutions and
strong local property rights. They are, according to the ICRG political risk rating,
countries with political risk of equal to 65 or above.97 Therefore, “only countries
that are reforming and already have reasonably strong domestic institutions are
most likely to gain from ratifying BIT.”98
These results are similar to those found by Tobin and Rose-Ackerman in

93
Sornarajah, supra note 18, argues that “stability and other factors have a greater influence on
investment flows than do investment treaties.”
94
Tobin and Rose-Ackerman, supra note 76.
95
Eric Neumayer and Laura Spess, “Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase FDI to Developing
Countries?”, 33 World Development 10 (2005), p. 1567-1585.
96
Jeswald W. Salacuse and Nicholas P. Sullivan, “Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain,” 46 Harvard International Law Journal (2005), p. 67-130.
97
Mary Hallward-Driemeier, “Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI? Only a Bit.. And They
Bite”, (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3121. 2003).
98
Hallward-Driemeier, supra note 97.
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their first study that also finds this little correlation.99 Examining BITs signed
with the US, they argue that the relationship between BITs and FDI is very
weak, and that BITs only play a major role in countries where the investment
environment has already been improved. According to their research, BITs by
themselves, do not serve as a signal of a secure investment environment in host
states, and they only have a positive effect on FDI flows in countries which are
already in stable condition of business environment.
There are a number of possible explanations for the differences in these
results, which are obviously caused by the differences in methodology and
research design. Tobin and Ackerman’s first research has noticed this problem
when comparing their result with that of Salacuse and Sullivan’s. This includes
differences in the dataset, in the variables, in the time frame coverage. They
also argue that the selection of sample size creates their different result with
Neumayer and Spess, while it is also admitted that their research omitted major
countries including South Korea, China, and Central and Eastern European
Countries. Meanwhile, Neumayer and Spess claim that Hallward-Driemeier fails
to detect the signaling effect and lacks representative sample; while the work
of Salacuse and Sullivan is cross-sectional that it falls short when detecting the
direct impact. However, they cannot elaborate their extremely different outcome
with that of Tobin and Ackerman.
The second work of Tobin and Rose-Ackerman attempts to converge the
conflicting findings of previous studies by highlighting the way the political
environment may interact with BITs to influence the level of FDI. The significance
of the updated work of Tobin and Ackerman is that, both theoretically and
empirically, BITs cannot be judged in isolation. Each of the discussed papers
assumes that the effect of BITs on FDI flows is an independent aspect of the
broader political and economic environment, while “their impact on host state
FDI flows must be studied within the context of the political, economic and
institutional features of the host state”.100  
This indicates that BITs cannot attract FDI by themselves, it must take
into account other determining environments. They argue that risky investment
environment due to dysfunctional government might permit foreign investors
to opt out of domestic institutions through BITs. However, foreign investors are
unlikely interested in prtnership with governments of very weak governance
practices. Rather than being substitutes, “improvements in the political
environment for investment are likely to complement BITs and further enhance
their impact.”101 Therefore, on balance, BITs will have a positive interaction with
the underlying political determinants of investment.  
Their econometric models display that as a country’s political environment
for investment improves, the impact of signing an additional BIT increases.  The
figure below provides greater understanding of this preposition.102   
For countries with good investment environments and strong politicaleconomic environments such as Malaysia and Chile, an additional BIT always
has a positive impact on estimated flows of FDI, until they decrease in response

99
Jenifer Tobin and Susan Rose-Ackerman, “FDI and the Business Environment in Developing
Countries: the Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties”, (Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 293,
2005).
100
Tobin and Rose-Ackerman, supra note 76.
101
Tobin and Rose-Ackerman, supra note 76.
102
The graph is formulated by Tobin and Rose-Ackerman, supra note 76.
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to the total number of BITs in the world.  However, for countries with weaker
political-economic and investment environments, this positive impact is
increasingly smaller (say Georgia and Malawi), with those in the lowest part,
say Sudan and Afghanistan, reaching a point of zero impact even before the
number of existing BITs in the world arrives at the maximum level. This support
the hypo article that only the most developed of the developing countries, thus
with mediocre political risk, gain positive impact from signing additional BITs
according to the findings.103 In conclusion, only with a broader understanding of
the political-economic environment one can fully understand the impact of BIT
programs on FDI flows.
As a further complementary study, Aisbett finds conformity with the work
of Tobin and Ackerman by introducing a new concept of endogenous relationship
between investment flows and the investment treaties to disentangle causation
from correlation.104 Aisbett employs a simple model to show empirical
econometric evidence that BIT participation is endogenous -as opposed to the
exogenous effect from BITs - and may be driven by omitted variables such as a
change in the domestic policy environment of the host. The model also shows
the potential for reverse causality, where a higher growth rate of FDI leads to
increased probability of a BIT being formed.
Having concluded the above finding, the article takes the standpoint that
BITs matter. Otherwise, there is no need to discuss change or renegotiation of
new provision in BITs related to public interest, because it would nevertheless
fail to render the positive impact one would expect. However, this positive
impact is attributed to the domestic institutions, and how the interplay between
BITs and host states’ domestic institutions define the political risks of direct
investing as perceived by foreign investors.
Another issue left unanswered in the economic impact, in relation to the
flexibility of BITs and the incorporation of social and environmental clauses, is
the cost of BITs. This is acknowledged by Neumayer and Spess, a few of BITs
optimists, as follows:
“whether the demonstrated benefits of signing BITs in the form of increased
FDI inflows are higher than the substantial costs, - which developing
countries incur in negotiating, signing, concluding, and complying with the
obligations typically contained in such treaties -, is impossible to tell. What
we do know is that BITs fulfill their purpose, and those developing countries
that have signed more BITs…are likely to receive more FDI in return.”105

BITs are not costless. Resources are expended on the design, negotiation,
and enforcement of BITs. “When ratifying BITs, host states sacrifice policy
flexibility and risk sizable fines and legal costs if they are sued by an
investor.”106

103
The same conclusion is reached for membership in international organizations in general, that
signaling effect for foreign investments works best for countries with mediocre risk ratings. See Axel Dreher,
Heiner F. Mikosch, and Stefan Voigt, “Membership in International Organizations as a Signaling Device for
Foreign Investors”, Membership in International Organizations as a Signaling Device for Foreign Investors”,
(3rd Annual Conference of the Political Economy of International Organizations 28-30 January 2010).
104
Emma Aisbett, “Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Correlation versus
Causation”, (Munich Personal RePec Archive, 2007).
105
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Foreign Investors’ Choices : International and Domestic Law Dynamics
1. The Route to Foreign Investors’ Choices
I would like to reiterate several key points I have elaborated above as
follows. Firstly, the standard model that emphasizes on the dynamic time
inconsistency problem of the host states do no longer hold up in the present
global economic environment. The incentives between the parties are always
considered as conflicting, and the potential host states have the incentive to
commit opportunistic behavior to expropriate the foreign investors’ assets. BITs
are then expected to bolster the credibility of host states’ commitments, thereby
mitigating the inconsistency problem and promoting FDI. This, however, does
not take into consideration the cooperative interests of the parties, the reiterated
games played, and the differences in nature between the actors.
Secondly, the standard model also fails to capture the importance of
domestic institutions, as already demonstrated in empirical studies, as well
as the continuous bargaining at the domestic level. Domestic institutional
matters and foreign investors’ capacities to influence domestic institutions
will determine the bargaining outcome. Thirdly, the incorporation of strict
provisions in BITs concerning social and environmental protection disregard
the costs imposed by those provisions on the ability of the host states to enact
benevolent regulations for social and environmental purpose. It also does not
accommodate the uncertainty over the observability and verifiability of social
and environmental affairs, which despite technological advancement, often
sparks technical debates among the experts.
Fourthly, it is impossible for the potential host states to ask for better
provisions in BIT that incorporate more flexible social and environmental
discretionary power, because they lack credible bargaining power in BIT
negotiation. BITs serves not only as protection device for foreign investors but
also as signaling device of the host states about their willingness to integrate
in the global economy and represent the general economic environment of the
host states. Violation against BITs incurs excessive reputational costs by means
of network externalities and makes any threat of host states to exit the system
not credible, because it does not arise to the level of efficient breach.
Lastly, the recent phenomenon of several capital exporting states offering
more flexible provisions in their signed and/or model BITs suggest that the only
possible route for flexible social and environmental provisions to flourish is
through structuring the incentives of the capital exporting states.
All of these are developed to frame the answers to the question asked as
the starting point of the article: under what condition a capital exporting state
could introduce higher flexibility for regulating social and environmental affairs
in a BIT negotiation?
2. Issue Linkage: International and Domestic Law Trade-Off

With due observance of the importance of domestic institutions, capital
exporting states would introduce higher flexibility on social and environmental
affairs when they (and the foreign investors on which behalf they act) manage to
link the potential benefit (or utility) derived between BIT protection and access
to domestic lawmaking.
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The only alternative for foreign investors to retain their ex ante bargaining
power is to gain access to legal and regulatory making in the host states’ domestic
legal environment, ensuring that the domestic legal system will take their
interests into account. The degree of openness of that access is of paramount
importance in BIT negotiation.
There are many evidences to demonstrate this. Around 25 percent of FDI
made by privately-owned firms in the global electricity and power generating
industry during the 1990s were into countries that ranked in the top quartile
of policy risk.107 Further, following the wave of nationalizations in the early
1970s in Chile, a study of the copper industry found that the firms which
developed domestic and transnational alliances were successful in getting full
compensation for nationalized assets, while those who did not form domestic
alliances were not.108 Kobrin also found evidence that host states refrain from
conducting any opportunistic behaviors against firms in the manufacturing
industries, particularly in high technology sectors.109
Bennett and Sharpe even suggested a reverse OBM incentive structure in
the Mexican automotive sectors. The Mexican government’s bargaining power
was strongest ex-ante because of the huge market. Ex-post, as foreign firms had
become integrated into the Mexican economy and developed strong relationships
with local firms, their bargaining power increased rather than obsolesced. The
continuous flow of the promised technology transfers further kept host states
dependent on the foreign investors.110
The above exemplifies the advantages that foreign investors made to
retain their bargaining power. On the host states’ side, Chile is the country that
managed to pursue their interests at the domestic level without committing
opportunistic acts in the international level. While BITs limit many of their
governmental capacity, including environmental regulation, Chile pursues these
at the domestic deal level, rather than requiring them.   They bargain hard to
ensure that the environmental practices of firms are reviewed, that linkages to
the local economy will be created and so forth.111
This analysis suggests that capital exporting states (hereby denoted as
“C”) are faced with three legal policy alternatives to secure the investment of
their constituent foreign investors: (1) protection under BITs (hereinafter “PC”)
or (2) access to influence legal and regulatory making (hereinafter “AC”), or
(3) the combination of both, with which composition the same level of utility
is generated. Assumption is made that foreign investors will always prefer
the third option (combination) because the risks will be distributed between
107
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the two available institutions, and it enables the investor to resort to another
channel, should one exogenous shock over the other emerges. The greater the
BITs protection, the lesser a foreign investors need to have access to domestic
legal and regulatory making. In contrast, if the investor has already obtained
sufficient access to legal and regulatory making, then the benefit from having
strict BIT protection decreases.
While the choices between them can generate different utility level, the
combination that generates the same can be placed into one single indifference
curve of foreign investors’ preferences. The increase in level of utility is simply
for the purpose of ordering/ranking the bundle of goods (ordinal approach).
The level of PC is measured by the level of property rights protection of the
foreign investors; and the level of AC is measured by the degree of openness of
domestic legal institutions -as will be further elaborated in the next sub-section.
The closer the Indifference Curve (IC) to the origin, the lesser utility it generates.
And as combination is always preferred to one extreme option, the curve is
convex to the origin.
Now the preferences of a potential host state are also incorporated in
the model (hereby denoted as “H”). Host states also have preferences among:
(1) protection under BITs (hereinafter “PH”) or (2) access to influence legal
and regulatory making (hereinafter “AH”), or (3) the combination of both, with
which composition the same level of utility is generated. Indifference curves
which display various levels of utility of Host states can also be portrayed into
the graph.
Remember that the previous theory that is solely based on the
international level of protection under BITs only manages to explain the tradeoff between strict and flexible provisions, that is to say that only the flexible ones
will be welfare enhancing jointly for both parties. The rationale for negotiation
and exchange is not incorporated and it requires other models, namely the
competitive pressure that results in strategic behavior and transaction costs
approach, to explain why potential host states are willing to enter into BIT that
incorporates strict provisions.
The following illustration based on the Edgeworth Box analysis.
However,112 it further incorporates the trade-off between international protection
(whether strict or flexible) and domestic access to lawmaking (whether open or
closed), as the explanatory variables and demonstrates that Pareto improving
exchange between capital exporting states and host states, is possible.
Suppose there are two parties negotiating a BIT, a capital exporting state
and a potential host state. The red line signifies ICs for the capital exporting
state and the blue lines for potential host state. ICs with bold contour, both the
red (C3) and blue ones (H3), represent the minimal capacity necessary for the
negotiation to start in the first place. Say, a country that wants to attract an
investment but cannot signal credibility in the international level and does not
have the resources to open up its access to domestic lawmaking will not be able
to find a partner who is willing to enter into a BIT with the country in question.
The yellow colored lens-shaped area between C3 and H3 represents the set of
feasible agreements. Any agreement reached inside the area will make one of
the parties better off without making another worse off. The dotted line of BC
112
The model is inspired by the work of Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The
Logics of Two Levels Game”, 42 International Organization 3 (1988), p. 427-460.
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and BH, being the budget lines, are the minimum budget that must be invested by
states, should they want to have Pareto improving exchange in the BIT market.
Although additional subtleties (such as the nature of the “contract curve”
at which the Pareto optimal point is found) might be further extracted, the
main argument from this type of analysis is simple: the possibility of package
deals between international and domestic law opens up a rich array of strategic
alternatives for the negotiating parties in the BIT bargaining game.
3. Determinants for Changes in Foreign Investors’ Preferences

Pursuant to the illustration above, from the foreign investor’s perspective
there are several changes that can affect the bargaining power and position in a
BIT negotiation, the structure for which is channeled through the preferences of
the capital exporting state.
Firstly, changes in foreign investor’s capabilities in gaining access to
domestic legal and regulatory making. A foreign investor can accumulate and
have better knowledge about a host state’s domestic legal system because of
learning effect from the previous investment or because of institutional distances
(that countries with more institutional features of the capital exporting state will
be easier to gain access to).113 The knowledge will push forward the preference
curve but remains in the area of feasible agreements, as portrayed by the graph
below.
The change in the foreign investor’s subjective capabilities is exemplified
by the shift of the green dotted line of budget line from BC to BC’. The change
pushes the IC of capital exporting states from C3 to C3’. Although the new IC of
C3’ remains within the area of feasible agreements, the size is greatly reduced.
This is because of the foreign investor’s confidence on its stronger bargaining
position. Should the host state intends to behave opportunistically, the foreign
investor will immediately gain access to the domestic legal system.
Secondly, changes in the objective degree of openness of access to
legal and regulatory making will also affect the bargaining position. Concrete
examples include judicial reform initiatives that increase judicial transparency
and eradicate judicial corruption, thus enhancing domestic court’s capabilities
and capacities to adjudicate matters properly. The graph below portrays change
due to decrease in price of access to legal and regulatory making.
Again, as the increase in the degree of openness of access to legal
and regulatory making might reduce demand of the foreign investor in the
international level of BIT negotiation, foreign investors in fact gain better
bargaining advantage, because they will secure in the domestic level, so the
cost of “no-agreement” or vetoed at the international level will be cheaper. The
foreign investor, consequently, will play the hawk/dove game against the host
state,114  a game that will not risk losing because of the domestic advantage.
Thirdly, the foreign investor can advance its bargaining power if the
price of BIT protection is cheaper. One of which includes, for instance, that the
international investment jurisprudence in investor-state arbitration concerning
social and environmental protection has become more stable and predictable
Holburn and Zelner, supra note 107.
The smaller the win-set options for one party, the smaller the cost for veto or “no-agreement”,
and consequently the more credible one’s demand in a negotiation. Putnam, supra note 112; Thomas
Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, (Harvard University Press, 1981).
113
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with clear legal principles that can be derived out of them. This will greatly
increase the level of predictability of investor-state arbitration.
The graph above depicts the cost reduction of protecting the foreign
investor through BIT. The cost reduction increases the utility of the foreign
investor, consequently increasing its expected benefit at the domestic level.
Nevertheless, despite its push for more open access to legal and regulatory
making at the domestic level, it does require more cost to persist on that issue.
And despite the effort is falling within the budget line of the foreign investor,
one possible explanation about one might not pursue at the domestic level even
further is one of opportunity costs that might be better allocated to other area.
4. Organization of Legal System and Foreign Investors’ Choices

Having discussed previously about the role of access to legal and regulatory
making and the trade-off foreign investors must make, the next issue would
be what exactly the meaning of the term is. In short, how to define the degree
of openness of access to legal and regulatory making? This sub-section briefly
seeks to identify and further scrutinize which legal institutions matter and how
domestic legal processes affect investor perceptions, toward which end I call for
better definitions of the interplay, a conceptual structure relating domestic legal
institutions to a foreign firm, and information about the role of domestic legal
institutions.
The degree of openness is the extent to which foreign investors can
influence the legal and regulatory decision making within the host state’s
domestic legal system. This perspective emphasizes on the objective features of
the legal system that can be used by foreign investors to pursue their interests,
and not on the foreign investors’ subjective capabilities in such recourse. For
example, the division of power between the central and local government
concerning the authority to issue social and environmental regulation; whether
the legislative structure allows organized civil societies and interest groups
to voice their opinions; whether the highest court is independent from the
executive’s influence; whether the national authorities (executive or judiciary)
have strong influence over lawmaking at the local level; and so forth.115 A
subjective approach, by contrast, implies the use of certain criteria subjectively
tailored and considered as the necessary institutional endowments for foreign
investors. These include various institutional risk assessments or rule of law
measurement projects such as the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) or
The World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business.
The best starting point for dissecting the objective features is a general
comparative legal study that compares various legal systems in the world.
The classic method of comparison, at least as far as the Western legal origin is
concerned, is the distinction between common law and civil law legal system.
Many, nevertheless, have come to the conclusion that this distinction is no longer
relevant in practice and the operation of law is far more complex. Judges in a
civil law country often adhere to previous legal decisions, though not necessarily
binding, while legislators in a common law country have enacted various legal
principles by means of legislations, reducing the role of the judiciary.116 A
115
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new way of comparing legal system is better suited by determining whether
lawmaking process is centralized or decentralized.
This new distinction is related not only to the level of legal and regulatory
making (whether national or local), but most importantly measured by the
number of actors involved, too. In a highly concentrated system, few actors
are involved in the lawmaking, as in a decentralized system, greater range
of opportunities is provided for actors to participate in lawmaking and
enforcement.117 This distinction of legal system based on locus of decision
making is also discussed by others, including Glaeser and Shleifer,118 Damaska,119  
and Milhaupt and Pistor.120
That being said, a foreign investor’s access to legal and regulatory making
of the host state depends as to whether the legal system of the host is centralized
or decentralized. In a centralized system, law is mostly driven by regulations as
opposed to litigation. In practice only limited number of actors can have access
to the legislative body because the structure and method of the civil societies
organized to raise the subject matter will determine the outcome.121 Litigation
driven lawmaking, or private ordering, is more decentralized and allows more
actors to participate in the process, and the law emerges out of spontaneous
order via Hayek’s bottom-up adaptation by means of adjudication.122  
However, to point out that one system is better or more efficient than
the other simply disregard the institutional context and different responses of
the affected parties (i.e. foreign investors) in the respective system. Concrete
example is China which has become the main attraction for FDI although the
legal and regulatory making is highly centralized and concentrated in the hands
of the Communist Party officials and bureaucrats.123 The capabilities of foreign
investors doing business in China signify their adaptation to a centralized legal
decision making environment, as opposed to doing business in the United States
with more decentralized system. There are other examples that show foreign
investors’ preferences over centralized system because it provides stability, such
as case of the increase of FDI in Chile or Indonesia during their authoritarian
regime.124
In a centralized legal system, the mechanism operates through legislative,
regulatory, and policy making process, whereby interest groups attempt to
influence political actors seeking to retain public office within the constraints
imposed by a formal structure. The main agents of change in an emergent
institution are the organized interest groups.125 In a decentralized legal
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system, by contrast, the mechanism operates through “creative destruction”
of legal principles, from one court decisions into another influenced by legal
professionals of judges, lawyers, prosecutors, law enforcement agencies, and
other relevant parties. These parties also compete to influence the outcome of
the law.
A centralized legal system is ex-ante unpredictable and unstable. However,
once a foreign investor manages to gain access and influence over the main actors,
the ex-post outcome will be predictable and stable. A decentralized legal system
is ex-ante predictable and stable because it provides a clear rule of the game
for many players to interact in such system. Nevertheless, the ex-post outcome
is unpredictable and unstable due to the rapid pace of the creative destruction.
Organizing interest groups is preferred if the system is centralized, and investing
in litigation skills if the system is decentralized, or by the combination of both.
These differences in the organization of legal system make defining and
measuring the “degree of openness” very complex. Domestic legal system must
not be considered as institutional endowment; rather dynamic relationship
with the foreign investors, being one will influence the other, and vice versa.
Foreign investors will always assess their own capabilities to cope with these
institutional differences prior to entering a market for FDI. Furtherance to their
assessment, and if the decision to enter the market is taken, they will always
have to maintain, manage, and deal with all of the institutional risks and all
changes that occur therein. This is not covered in the article, and will be a good
design for the consequent research agenda.
Conclusion

As a response to the question of which condition that would allow a
capital exporting state to introduce higher flexibility for regulating social and
environmental affairs in a BIT negotiation, the article offer the answer on issue
linkage between the following issues: 1). the level of protection under BIT; 2).
the degree of openness of access to domestic legal and regulatory making of
the host state and 3). the foreign investor’s capabilities to deal with the tradeoff. Ceteris paribus, the linkage enables a set of feasible Pareto improving deals
out of BIT negotiation. Foreign investor will no longer require a strong level of
protection by means of strict BIT provisions concerning the host state’s right to
regulate social and environmental matters if it succeeds to manage in gaining
access to the domestic legal system of the host state, which subject conditionally
to the legal system’s degree of openness. This implies a two-level trade-off,
namely with regard to the BIT provisions (strict vs. flexible) and the access to
domestic legal system (open vs. closed).
The informal model offered in the article is a dynamic one because it is not
only incorporating the objective views on the level of BITs protection and the
domestic legal system’s degree of openness, but also the subjective capabilities
of foreign investors to make the trade-off and their respond to exogenous
change. At the domestic level, this means that the degree of openness affects
foreign investors’ preferences, but foreign investors will also try to influence the
structure of the legal system.
Regulation, (University of Chicago Press, 1975).
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